Optimizely Attack (Nov. 16, 2026): What the Malicious Script Did and What to Do

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Close-up of a monitor showing colorful HTML and JavaScript source code, including script tags and a cookie-consent snippet
HTML and JavaScript source code on a developer’s screen.
Photo: Martin Vorel, 2016, via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)

On Monday, Nov. 16, 2026, visitors to the websites of Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce and about 170 other organizations loaded a malicious script that those sites never meant to serve. It did not come from the sites’ own servers. It came through Optimizely, a company whose software lets websites test different versions of their pages, after an attacker wrote code into the settings of its customers’ projects.

The short answer: The security firm Report URI found malicious JavaScript in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely script files it checked, belonging to 178 organizations. The code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, tried to skim card details typed into a site’s own payment forms, and tried to load iPhone exploit kits on older iPhones and iPads. Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product and that it has fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. Report URI saw every infected file clean by 23:11 UTC on Nov. 16 (3:11 PM PT). Nobody has shown that an iPhone was actually taken over, but the attacker’s wallets did receive about $7,150 in crypto, and no one outside the attacker knows how many cards were captured.

Below: how the attack worked, what the code did, who was hit, what Optimizely has said, what is still unknown, and what to do whether you visited an affected site or run one.

Why a testing tool could reach 178 sites

Optimizely Web is an experimentation platform. A company that uses it adds a line to its pages that loads a JavaScript file, called a snippet, from Optimizely’s content delivery network at cdn.optimizely.com. According to Report URI, the snippet contains Optimizely’s code, the customer’s experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript, where the customer can add custom code that runs on every page. The snippet also updates itself whenever the customer changes a setting, so a change made in Optimizely’s dashboard reaches visitors without the customer’s developers releasing anything, as The Hacker News describes the vendor’s documentation.

That is the path the attacker used. Report URI says the attacker wrote a small loader into the Project JavaScript of many unrelated customers’ projects and left the rest of each snippet alone. The files kept arriving from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s own certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted. Report URI says the network served exactly what the projects contained, so this was not cache poisoning. The change was inside the projects themselves.

Most infected files used a plain script tag pointing at 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Report URI saw two other versions of the loader: one with the address hidden in base64, so a search for the domain would miss it, and one with a full inline copy of the payload that still runs if the domain is blocked. Hudson Rock, as reported by iTWire, found complete fallback copies in scripts tied to the BBC and HSBC UAE.

What the code did

Every visitor received the same file, track.js, and every part of it was active at once, Report URI says. The firm counted 26 rebuilds of the payload during the day as the attacker added features and wallets. What a visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.

It swapped crypto addresses

The script looks for valid wallet addresses (Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, Tron, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin), checks their checksums so it only touches real ones, and replaces them with the attacker’s. Report URI says it does this in page text, form fields, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests, and scans again whenever the page changes. In practice, an address copied while an infected page was open might not be the address that gets pasted.

A Ledger hardware wallet plugged by cable into a tablet whose screen shows a Bitcoin transaction and an exchange ledger entry
A Ledger hardware wallet plugged into a tablet during a Bitcoin transfer in 2017.
Photo: FlippyFlink, 2017, via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)

This part worked. Report URI traced about $7,040 in payments to the attacker’s wallets as of 19:25 UTC on Nov. 16, and its later update puts the total near $7,150, mostly in Bitcoin. The attacker then emptied the wallets in the early hours of Nov. 17 UTC, and Report URI says the cash-out address matches one used in March and on Nov. 3, 2026, which links the actor to earlier attacks.

It skimmed cards typed into a site’s own forms

From 13:43 UTC, the script watched form submissions and POST requests for a card number that passes the standard checksum, an expiry date and a three- or four-digit security code, and sent the set to the attacker’s server. It could not read card fields inside a payment provider’s hosted frame, such as Stripe’s or Adyen’s, because those load from a different origin. Cards typed into a site’s own fields were exposed.

It took cookies and screenshots in some cases

Only after swapping an address near wallet or payment wording, the script sent the attacker the page address, any cookies not marked HttpOnly, the original address it replaced and a screenshot of the page. Cookies marked HttpOnly cannot be read by page scripts, so they were out of reach.

It aimed exploit kits at older iPhones and iPads

On an iPhone, iPad or iPod, the script loaded a second script, boot.js, from two .icu domains. It read the iOS version and opened an exploit chain in a hidden frame: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and for iOS 26 a separate chain that, when Report URI looked, only collected details about the device. Google’s threat intelligence group described Coruna in March 2026 as a kit with five exploit chains and 23 exploits for iOS 13.0 through 17.2.1, and DarkSword as a JavaScript-only chain for iOS 18.4 through 18.7 that uses six vulnerabilities. Google says all the DarkSword vulnerabilities were patched by iOS 26.3 and that Coruna does not work on the latest iOS.

The kit’s own code comments list iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched. Report URI says pages loaded on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a symptom a visitor might have noticed. So far the evidence is of delivery, not compromise. Cynet, which fetched the second stage with an emulated iPhone browser, described conditional delivery and "not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad," according to The Hacker News. Hudson Rock likewise did not demonstrate a real iPhone being exploited, iTWire reports, and iTWire notes that the available evidence does not establish a new zero-day.

Who was hit

Report URI fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets, mostly found through its own crawl data, and says the real number is likely higher because it could only check the files it found in time. Its sector breakdown puts banking and finance first:

Sector (Report URI’s grouping)OrganizationsExamples
Banking and finance32Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset
Technology and software23Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab
Retail and fashion20IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle
Streaming and entertainment12Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast
News and media10CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR
Airlines and travel9Alaska Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM

The remaining organizations are spread across healthcare (8), telecoms (7), crypto and trading (6, including the hardware-wallet maker Ledger) and 11 other sectors. Optimizely’s own main site and login page carried the code too.

Two cautions apply. An affected page does not mean the company behind it was breached. Cynet’s researchers say a site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised, and Hudson Rock cautioned against reading it as exposure of an organization’s other services. And Report URI sells tools that detect exactly this kind of script change, a point Gizmodo flagged, so its sales pitch deserves the usual discount. Other firms, including StepSecurity and Cynet, have published their own analyses of the payload that are consistent with its account.

How it unfolded, and what Optimizely says

The first injection Report URI saw was at 04:21 UTC on Nov. 16 (8:21 PM PT on Nov. 15), in the BBC’s snippet. A mass clean-up began at about 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk’s snippet still carried the code. Smartsheet’s file had been cleaned and then infected again, which Report URI reads as a sign the attacker still had access at that point. By 23:11 UTC every infected file was clean and has stayed clean since. The attacker’s main server, 1688360[.]cc, was put on "clientHold" status at 00:37 UTC on Nov. 17 and no longer resolves.

Optimizely posted an incident notice on its status page at 01:02 UTC on Nov. 17 (5:02 PM PT on Nov. 16). Its first lines read:

Earlier today, Optimizely identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. We’ve fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects. (Optimizely status page, Nov. 17, 2026, 01:02 UTC)

The notice adds that Optimizely secured affected user accounts and put extra protections in place. Spokesperson Victoria Johnson told Gizmodo the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow, that Optimizely blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix, and that affected customers were notified.

What we know, and what is still unclear

What we know

Scale: Report URI found the code in 188 of 1,611 snippets, across 178 organizations, and expects the true count to be higher.

Method: Code was written into customers’ Project JavaScript fields and served from Optimizely’s own domain.

Payload: An address swapper, a card skimmer, cookie and screenshot theft, and a router for iPhone exploit kits.

Losses on record: About $7,150 in crypto received by the attacker’s wallets.

Status: All infected files seen as clean by 23:11 UTC on Nov. 16, and Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed.

What is still unclear

How the attacker got in. Optimizely points to its signup flow but has not published technical details. Report URI says it does not know how the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated projects.

How many people were affected. Report URI says it cannot see how many cards, cookies or screenshots reached the attacker, or how many iPhones were infected.

Who is behind it, and for how long. The attacker’s wallet history and an earlier injection wave point to an actor active since at least March 2026, but the full attack window and the identity are unknown.

Did a Content Security Policy help?

A content security policy, or CSP, is a browser instruction listing which hosts a page may load scripts from and send data to. Report URI evaluated the policies of 256 affected organizations’ hosts against what the payload needed. Its table shows 68 with no CSP at all, 50 where the policy let both the payload and the data theft through, and 17 where the payload ran but a data-sending rule blocked the card, cookie and screenshot theft while address swapping, which happens inside the page, still worked. Only 24 (15%) blocked the payload.

Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help, Report URI notes, because the malicious code arrived from that trusted host. The settings that let it through were ‘strict-dynamic’, which trusts any script a trusted script inserts, and ‘unsafe-eval’, which Report URI says Optimizely’s own documentation tells customers to allow. At HSBC, the CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy still ran through eval.

The affected sites did not have to be breached themselves; they only had to trust a script that changed.

What to do

If you visited an affected site on Nov. 16

Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which the kit’s own comments list as patched. Check any crypto transfer you made that day: if the address you pasted does not match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped, and StepSecurity advises confirming addresses on a hardware wallet’s own screen rather than against copied text. Watch your card statements if you typed a card number into one of these sites’ own payment forms. Report URI’s advice on cookies is aimed at site owners; for a visitor, signing out of an exchange or wallet site and back in is a cheap precaution.

If you run a site that uses Optimizely

Report URI’s steps: open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code and look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script you did not write; review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to your account and rotate the credentials; if your own forms take card numbers, treat cards entered on Nov. 16 as potentially exposed; treat any secrets in cookies not marked HttpOnly as exposed; and deploy a CSP with a tight connect-src, avoiding ‘unsafe-eval’ where you can, with reporting turned on. StepSecurity adds that a clean script downloaded after the clean-up cannot show what the same address served earlier, so check historical browser and security-policy reports too.

The bottom line

Monday’s incident was not a break-in at 178 companies. It was a break-in at one vendor whose code those companies had invited onto every page. The affected sites did not have to be breached themselves; they only had to trust a script that changed. The damage on record is modest, about $7,150 in crypto, but the card and exploit-kit parts were built to do more, and nobody outside the attacker can yet say how much they did. It landed on the same day as the Chase banking outage, which Chase attributed to a bug of its own rather than an attack. For ordinary visitors, the practical steps are short: update your iPhone, check any crypto payment you made that day, and watch your card statements.

Further reading

Cover of The Web Application Hacker's Handbook, a guide to finding and exploiting web application security flaws
The Web Application Hacker’s Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws

A developer-oriented guide to how web applications get attacked, useful background for anyone curious how injected scripts end up on pages.

Cover of Kim Zetter's book Countdown to Zero Day about the Stuxnet malware
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon

Journalist Kim Zetter’s account of how the Stuxnet malware was found and taken apart, a readable look at how exploits get discovered and named.

Norton 360 Deluxe antivirus software key card box for five devices
Norton 360 Deluxe Antivirus Software for 5 Devices (Key Card)

Security software adds a layer against known malicious sites and downloads, though a script served from a trusted host can slip past any single tool.

Apple 20W USB-C power adapter, a small white wall charger
Apple 20W USB-C Power Adapter

The fix for the iPhone side of this attack is updating iOS, and a charger in your bag makes it easy to do the update on the go.

Apple 240W USB-C to USB-C woven charge cable, two meters long, coiled
Apple 240W USB-C to USB-C Woven Charge Cable (2 m)

A 2-meter woven cable that charges an iPhone or iPad while you update it, back it up or sort out your accounts.

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